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Following the NIE…
By oceanguy | December 5, 2007
The contents of the latest National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities only interest me when compared with the previous version. It’s not what the report says but how it drastically it differs from the previous report that is so compelling.
One thing I don’t buy is that the report was “leaked” to embarrass Bush. It wasn’t leaked, it was released. Clearly from the format of the unclassified version made expressly for public release, it is not an unauthorized or even sneaky leak. In fact there are plenty of reasons to believe the Administration wanted the information in the public eye. As I said yesterday I believe the release is part of the diplomatic game being played with Iran and with the Russians and Chinese who have bene reluctant to support sanctions on Iran.
The Administration’s release of the information does more to damage the reputation of the intelligence agencies than it does to discredit the Bush Administration, though many Bush haters will be loathe to admit it. But then that’s the real rub of the report, isn’t it? It’s not the assessment per se, but the intended message in its release that is the story.
Let’s face it, despite the expressions of “with high confidence” and “with moderate confidence” sprinkled throughout the report, there are still an awful lot of caveats which, in the end, indicate that they really don’t know what Iran’s capabilities and intentions are. For instance:
• We acknowledge the potential for these to change during the time frame of the Estimate, but are unable to confidently predict such changes or their implications. This Estimate does not assess how Iran may conduct future negotiations with the West on the nuclear issue.
• In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have “proof” that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.
• (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.)
• …but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.
• We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.
• Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons
• We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
• Iran probably would use covert facilities— rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.
None of the above is at all reassuring. Nor does it give one any confidence that the Estimate’s public conclusion is correct. In fact, what those caveats tell us, is that the estimate is probably no better than the May 2005 version. That simply tells me that this released unclassified version is meant as a very public message to interested parties. It’s not meant as a tool for American decision makers. Perhaps the full classified version is, but what has been released is a diplomatic tool NOT an intelligence tool. So why worry?
My concern comes from the anti-Bush crowd who quickly jump on the information as a tool to batter the President. It seems that the majority of the press assumes the estimate to be true and accurate simply because they believe it hurts Bush and his Administration. In doing that, there is danger that the caveats get overlooked and that the debate shifts to assume Iranian innocence… THAT is dangerous.
I’ve written before about my experience with Iranian military technology and its management. Because of my experience I do not trust the Iranian defense hierarchy to be able to safely and effectively manage any high tech program. Thats’ not to say they do not have the ability to design and build high tech weapons, but the culture of their military professionals make management of those weapons extremely problematic. That is why we must be extremely cautious and MUST err on the side of safety when it comes to our efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
We cannot count on deterrence to check Iranian nuclear weapons plans. Possessing superior nuclear capability and threats of retaliation may or may not deter Iran from using a bomb. With questionable military professionalism affecting their Armed forces and the heavy influence of a theocratic political leadership, many of whom espouse apocalyptic beliefs, it is entirely possible, if not probable that Iran is undeterrable. Again, we should be erring on the safe side of things by assuming that deterrence will not work, the consequences of being wrong are much too serious. We simply MUST prevent Iran from getting the bomb.
If one of the reasons for the Annapolis Retreat was to send a message to Iran, and if the NIE was re-enforcing and helping to refine ( or expand ) the message, then we are on the right track. Looking at the release of the NIE as public communique to Iran makes sense of the timing and the content of the document. Although it doesn’t give me any real comfort, it does make it a more interesting and compelling story.
With American Military forces operating on Iran’s Eastern, Western and Southern frontiers, it’s to be expected that Iran feels threatened. Release of a somewhat conciliatory document should help persuade Iran that they are not being threatened with imminent bombing. It’s probably even good that the MSM is spinning the report as another Bush failure, at least as far as it gets them off the “we’re about to bomb Iran” meme. Whatever the case, we can rest assured that there is a whole lot more to this story than has been reported.
Topics: Countdown to War |
December 5th, 2007 at 1:33 pm
Until I got to the last paragraph, I was thinking that the release of the NIE served to undermine the rationale of the Annapolis conference being to form a united front against Iran. I’m not sure I agree but what you write seems plausible.
December 5th, 2007 at 4:13 pm
I think the timing Annapolis summit and the release of the document is no coincidence. It makes sense that the message to Iran from each is different, but complimentary. I draw that conclusion while observing that the Administration, while not bragging about the conclusions of the NIE, have not even attempted to spin in any other way… It appears they approve of the message even if they didn’t approve it.
December 7th, 2007 at 8:53 pm
I’ll ask the same question here that I asked on my own blog: Why is this NIE being taken as the gospel truth, whereas the previous one, which said that Iran was indeed pursuing nukes, was widely derided as a lie? Couldn’t be yet another example of media bias, could it?
December 8th, 2007 at 11:40 am
Bald-Headed Geek - They take it as a gosple truth, because it is easyer to face an not dangerous Iran than to face the truth about an Iran that wants to go nuclear and to unleash war
December 12th, 2007 at 10:27 am
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